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ABSTRACT 
The integration of large-scale wind energy in the United States will require controllable assets to provide 
more supplemental energy to maintain electrical reliability. Previous work has identified hydropower as 
an advantageous asset, due to its flexibility and low emissions production.  While many dams currently 
provide energy and environmental services in the United States and globally, we find that multi-use 
hydropower facilities would face policy conflicts if asked to store and release water to accommodate wind 
integration.  Specifically,  we  develop  a  model  simulating  hydroelectric  operational  decisions  along  a 
multi-use river system when the electric facility is able to provide wind integration services through a 
mechanism that we term ‘flex reserves’. We use Kerr Dam in North Carolina as a case study, simulating 
operations under two alternative reservoir policies, one reflecting current policies and the other regulating 
flow levels to promote downstream ecosystem conservation. Even under perfect information, Kerr Dam 
faces policy conflicts in providing any substantial levels of ‘flex reserves’ while  maintaining release 
levels  consistent  with  other  river  management  goals.  These  policy  conflicts  are  exacerbated  during 
periods of low flow. Increasing payments for provision of flex reserves does not solve the policy conflict.  
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1 Introduction 
 
   As a growing percentage of energy demand is served by wind energy, wind integration strategies 
are being developed to better predict expected wind supply and use existing generators to balance errors 
in the wind power forecast. An inaccurate forecast of increasing larger amounts of wind supply presents a 
considerable problem for energy system operators. Energy storage has been identified as a potentially 
important technological pathway to enable large-scale intermittent renewables (meant here to primarily 
encompass wind and solar, though we acknowledge that hydroelectricity itself may exhibit significant 
variability over annual time scales). Existing hydroelectric dams represent a vital energy storage option as 
they are the largest source of renewable electrical generation. Pumped-hydro storage (PHS), batteries, 
compressed energy air storage (CAES) are other commonly proposed storage technologies to aid wind 
integration(see(1–3) ), though storage via new pumped hydro represents a highly limited option due to 
construction costs, property right difficulties, and no plans for large-scale development in U.S. since 1995 
(4). In our work, we investigate the decision of a moderately-sized multi-use dam to provide a type of 
reserve service to electric system operators (compensating for errors in forecasts of wind energy 
production). This operational mode for multi-use dams is technically feasible, but the demand to smooth 
wind power variability may conflict with federal and regional water management policies or priorities.   
Particularly relevant to our analysis is a recent report from the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) focusing on market integration for renewable electric generation. While technology 
exists to facilitate large-scale renewables integration, NREL finds that non-competitive market prices to 
generators offering supplemental power from storage or electrical generation are the main barrier to 
seamlessly integrate large capacities of renewables. We recognize that competitive pricing is an important 
factor for inducing participation in market constructs, but we find that multi-use dams face more intricate 
policy constraints than simply prices. A large body of research has thoroughly examined the impact of 
large-scale wind penetration (see (5–8)), and several regional energy entities have carried out wind 3 
 
integration programs in effort to lower consumer electricity costs and maintain system reliability. 
However, we need a greater understanding of how current institutions and policies inhibit generators to 
offer supplemental capacity and energy. 
Regional electric system operators in the U.S. have implemented a variety of wind integration 
programs. For example, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) has initiated a pilot program for twice-
an-hour, versus the traditional once-an-hour, wind scheduling market  to reduce the system costs 
associated with excessive wind or under-producing wind periods in the Pacific Northwest (9). Five 
Northwest states in partnership with BPA, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the 
Department of Energy (DOE) have launched the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Initiative, a demand 
response program with ideas to store surplus wind energy by turning hot water heaters on and off to 
maintain low electricity prices (10).  In 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
approved the definition of wind as a Dispatchable Intermittent Resource (DIR) that can fully participate in 
the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) five minute real-time dispatch market; the intent is 
that all wind resources will be covered under the DIR program by 2013 (11). Wind in the New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO) electrical territory must also operate as a dispatchable resource, 
so it is not a price taker and is not subject to manual curtailment to balance system supply and demand 
and transmission congestion costs (12). In the PJM Interconnection, which covers the Mid-Atlantic area 
of the U.S., wind may operate as a non-dispatchable unit or participate in the real-time market as a 
dispatchable unit, incurring penalties for supply deviations greater than 5% of the forecast (13). 
This study focuses on policy conflicts for existing multi-purpose dams used to integrate utility-
scale wind capacity in geographies prone to hydrological uncertainty and population growth. We simulate 
hydropower decision making under perfect information and distinct water management policies to 
enhance the downstream environment and provide a type of reserve capacity to balance unexpected 
changes in wind power output. Altering reservoir management for improving downstream ecological 
conditions remains a crucial policy objective that will gain importance with unpredictable hydrological 4 
 
conditions and population pressures (14)). Following (4), we refer to this service as a ‘flex reserve’ 
market that calls for short-term supplemental electricity at time intervals longer than the frequency-based 
ancillary services regulation market but shorter than the synchronized reserve market (i.e., response times 
longer than seconds but shorter than hourly or half-hourly; see Model Description for further details). We 
use current regulation energy prices ($/MWh) as a base-case proxy for prices that would prevail in the 
flex reserve market, although we perform a sensitivity analysis on the level of the flex-reserve price. We 
find that if prices in a flex reserve market were similar to regulation prices, then multi-use dams would 
have little incentives to supply substantial amounts of flex reserve capacity. Allocation decisions to the 
flex reserve market are further reduced during a drought year. More importantly, water and 
environmental-related institutional constraints, rather than the level of compensation for providing flex 
reserve services, limit the operational and policy changes that would be necessary for multi-purpose 
hydroelectric dam to offer substantial quantities of flex reserve capacity.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, including the 
case study and problem formulation. Section 3 follows with the results, and Section 4 ends with policy 
suggestions and conclusion. 
2 Model description 
 
2.1 Case Study: Roanoke River Basin 
Our model simulates reservoir allocations decisions at Kerr Dam, a multi-use hydroelectric dam 
located at the headwaters of the Roanoke River Basin. The U.S. Corps of Engineers (USACE) develops 
policies governing operations at Kerr Dam. Dominion Power manages Kerr and two downstream dams, 
Gaston and Roanoke Rapids. Releases from this dam system feed into the federally protected floodplains 
of the Hardwood Bottomland Forest, which has recently had over $40 million of conservation funds 
invested to improve their long-term viability (15). Releases at Kerr are influenced by a large number of 
factors. The energy declaration sets a weekly schedule for the upper bound on total  allowable power 5 
 
generated; the guide curve sets a lower bound rule for reservoir elevation and releases; and operations are 
also influenced by federally mandated policies (flood control, municipal water, low-flow protocol) 
enforced by the USACE. Dominion has wide discretion for controlling intra-weekly reservoir releases and 
storage. Dominion sells hydroelectric generation to markets run by PJM. Dominion also provides lost-
cost energy to local electric distribution companies that lie outside PJM’s electrical territory, collectively 
known as preference customers, in coordinate with the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA) (16).  
The model includes two policy scenarios based on the historical practices at Kerr Dam and an 
alternative water control plan to enhance the downstream environment, which we term the “ecosystem 
services” scenario. The policies describe two guide curve options: business-as-usual (BAU) and 
ecosystem services. Historical practice at Kerr Dam has been for Dominion to schedule operations during 
times of peak electricity demand, effectively chasing peak spot-market electricity prices (15). The 
ecosystem services scenario requires a high-flood, short duration release schedule that more closely 
follows natural flow levels to enhance the spawning season (March-June), which does not always 
coincide with peak generation patterns. Under both the BAU and ecosystem services guide curves, 
Dominion faces the decision to sell electricity in the PJM spot market
1 or allocate capacity for 
compensating for errors in PJM’s wind power forecast via the flex reserves market.  
We simulate operational decisions across a hydroclimatic gradient that captures the transition 
from a wet year to a 1-in-100 year meteorological drought. This event provides insight into how 
unpredictable, reduced water supplies affect dam operations, especially as population pressures and 
droughts are growing concerns in the Northern Coastal Plain area of North Carolina (14, 17, 18). We 
assume that Dominion has perfect knowledge of wind forecast errors in PJM and can thus make perfectly-
informed decisions to allocate capacity to the flex reserve market or to spot market sales. Incorporating 
uncertainty in Dominion’s expectation of the wind forecast error is a topic of ongoing research, but the 
                                                           
1 We note that the “spot” market in PJM is actually a one-day-ahead forward market.  The distinction between spot 
and day-ahead is not important for the purposes of our analysis. 6 
 
assumptions used in this paper reflect the best possible case for a multi-use dam offering capacity for 
wind integration services while managing a suite of water management policies (flood protocol, 
ecosystem services, drought releases, and hydroelectricity). The policy conflicts that we find when flex-
reserve provision is introduced into Kerr Dam’s decision making in this best-case scenario, particularly 
during drought years, suggests increasing difficulty in balancing operational objectives, particularly with 
additional stresses induced by climate change (14).  
2.2 Problem formulation 
 
The model includes a single objective for maximizing hourly revenue by selling energy into the 
day-ahead spot market and allocating reservoir capacity to a market that uses regulation prices as a proxy 
for prices that would prevail in a flex reserve market, as a base case (Equation 1). There are two decision 
variables for each time period. The first is the amount of energy scheduled into the spot market, yt. 
Consistent with current market rules for ancillary services in the PJM system (19), we assume that 
Dominion needs to offer into the day-ahead spot market in order to be eligible to provide flex reserves. 
Dominion receives the day-ahead spot market price pt for energy sales into the PJM spot market. We 
ignore operational costs in this model, but do include the opportunity cost of wheeling power to 
preference customers since this is an important determinant of revenues at Kerr Dam.  We let ySEPA,t 
denote the quantity sold to preference customers at a regulated price pSEPA,t .  As noted in (16), the price at 
which sales to preference customers are made is typically lower than the prevailing spot market price in 
the Dominion zone of PJM.  
The second decision variable is the amount of capacity offered into the flex reserve market for 
balancing the wind forecast error et. We note here that the wind forecast error could be either a positive or 
a negative number (i.e., the forecast wind output could be larger or smaller than the actual wind output).  
We use the following sign convention and terminology.  If actual wind output exceeds the forecast, we 
refer to this as an ‘oversupply’ event and et takes on positive values.  If actual wind output falls short of 7 
 
the forecast, we refer to this as an ‘undersupply’ event and et takes on negative values.  During each 
period, Kerr Dam can allocate capacity to balance an oversupply or undersupply event. The capacity 
allocated to balance oversupply events is denoted yO,t and the capacity allocated to balance undersupply 
events is denoted yU,t. The implied reservoir management strategies for balancing oversupply and 
undersupply events are quite different. Balancing an oversupply event would involve a reduction in water 
released through the turbine; thus Kerr would need to be storing water equivalent to at least the amount of 
oversupply capacity offered (yO,t). Balancing an undersupply event would require Kerr to release water 
equivalent to at least the amount of undersupply capacity offered (yU,t). We denote the flex reserve price 
as pFR,t (as discussed below, we use prices from the PJM regulation market as a base-case proxy for pFR 
and a perform sensitivity analysis to simulate the effects of higher prices). We assume that pFR,t is 
identical for providing both oversupply capacity and undersupply capacity. This assumption reflects 
current convention in the PJM regulation market (unlike in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
market, which has distinct prices for “regulation up” and “regulation down”).  
(1) 
Objective function: 
   
            
∑                          
    
   
                        
       
Such that:  
(2) 
                        
(3) 
                 
(4) 
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In our model, Kerr makes  decisions between the energy spot market and the flex reserves market 
on a daily basis, and each day’s decision is a sequence of scheduled energy and capacity allocations for 
each hour, defined by Tcap (t=1, 2,…Tcap  = 24 hours). We assume that Kerr Dam is a price-taker in both 
markets. Equation 2 indicates that the sum of the scheduled energy and the capacity allocation for flex 
reserves at each hour can be no larger than the turbine capacity. Remaining capacity that has not been 
stored for oversupply flex reserves is available to be sold in the scheduled energy market as defined in 
equation 3. Since we simulate daily energy and allocation decisions, total hourly output each day is 
bounded by the allowable generation for that day’s share of the weekly energy declaration (Equation 4; 
here we are using the same energy declaration framework as in (16)).  
2.3 Data and Modeling Scenarios 
The model uses historical data for price, load, wind forecast errors and hydrological conditions. 
All price data come from PJM archives from years 2006 to 2008. Scheduled market prices use hourly 
day-ahead prices, and the flex reserve market uses hourly regulation prices. For the same year timeframe, 
USACE hydrological data records are used for  hourly power production from the turbines, reservoir 
elevation, and release targets based on (15) to mimic ecosystem services guide curve at Kerr. Actual wind 
power production and wind forecast data are provided by a wind forecast model developed by PJM at five 
minute intervals from January to June 2010. We calculate hourly averages from the five minute actual and 
twenty-four hour ahead forecast data to coincide with the time length of the previous data. Wind error 
data are the difference from the hourly average actual and twenty-four hour forecast data. Due to limited 
wind data, model simulations focus on hydroelectric operations from January to June, capturing the 
spawning season in the Roanoke River Basin and seasonal electricity price peaks and lows from winter to 
early summer.   
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3 Results 
 
Our model assesses Kerr Dam’s incentives and barriers for diverting capacity away from the spot 
market to the flex reserve market, under the assumption that Kerr Dam possesses perfect information 
regarding prices in both markets and the errors in PJM’s forecast of wind energy output (i.e., oversupply 
and undersupply.  While perfect-information will not be available in the real market context, these 
assumptions provide a “best case” bounding scenario for the decision to provide wind integration service 
by multi-use hydroelectric facilities. Our modeling results, detailed in this section, suggest that even 
under this best-case informational scenario, the incentives for multi-use dams to provide flex reserves are 
weak, and substantial participation in the flex reserve market would require flexibility in storage and 
release policies that can create conflicts with other operational objectives. 
3.1 Willingness to offer capacity for flex reserves is insensitive to price 
 
The decision framework presented in Section 2 allows us to assess the conflicting incentives 
faced by multi-use dams in the face of demand to provide flex reserves in addition to other services. This 
section presents the results of our base-case decision analysis under the BAU and ecosystem services 
guide curves, under the assumption that prices in the flex reserves market are similar to those prevailing 
in the regulation market in PJM. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Kerr’s 
decision to supply flex reserves during oversupply events under the business-as-usual (BAU) and 
ecosystem services guide curves during peak and off-peak hours from 2006 to 2008. Using regulation 
prices as a proxy for a flex-reserve market, the guide curves restrict Kerr’s ability to provide oversupply 
flex reserves, where these amounts vary depending upon the type of guide curve, the hydrological 
conditions, magnitude of the forecast error, as well as the time of day where flex reserves are requested. 
Results for providing flex reserves during undersupply events are available upon request.  10 
 
Since multi-use dams typically store large volumes and have the capability to ramp output up or 
down rapidly, we might hypothesize that Kerr could accommodate oversupply wind forecast errors under 
the BAU guide curve, which is generally less constraining (i.e., requires smaller releases during certain 
times of the year). During off-peak hours over the transition from a wet to a dry year (2006-2007), Kerr is 
willing to provide 58% (2006) and 73% (2007) of total capacity needed to balance the oversupply forecast 
errors under the ecosystem services guide curve, but less than 20% (2006) and 60% (2007) under the 
BAU guide curve. This suggests that storage or releases for the downstream environment complement 
storing capacity during an oversupply of wind power and conflict with Dominion’s historical practice to 
sell electricity into the spot market, which may pose a significant potential cost in areas with growing 
drought risks. Conversely, allocating capacity to balance wind power variability conflicted with the 
ecosystem services guide curve in (16), as it resulted in increasingly larger opportunity costs. The 
capacity allocated for flex reserves under the ecosystem services guide curve exceeds allocations under 
the BAU guide curve, except during the severe drought year 2008. This demonstrates that water scarcity 
highly influences the decision to offer flex-reserve fill-in power in both peak and off-peak hours and 
directly conflicts with river flow targets for the downstream environment.  11 
 
 
 
Figure 1. This figure shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the percentage of the capacity 
allocated for balancing wind forecast errors during an oversupply of wind power during peak hours (left) 
and off-peak hours (right) under the BAU (solid) and the ecosystem services (dashed) guide curves.  12 
 
NREL (4)argue that pricing of new ancillary services products to facilitate renewables integration 
is crucial; Model simulations from (16) have made similar arguments based on the notion of pricing 
ancillary services based on opportunity costs. While we agree that price is an important component of a 
well-functioning market, our results in Figure 1 are primarily due to policy constraints embodied in the 
guide curve.  The figure would not change substantially if prices for flex reserves were increased.  We 
performed a sensitivity analysis of the regulation prices to highlight our finding that resolving policy 
constraints for multi-purpose dams through price alone seems unlikely to be successful. We focus on the 
ecosystem services guide curve because it better illuminates the policy complexities involved with 
integrating wind generation using hydropower. Figure 2 displays the results of a sensitivity analysis in 
which the price for flex reserves was increased (up to the current PJM price cap of $1,000 per MWh) and 
the optimization problem presented in Section 2 was solved for each price level.  We note that in no 
month can Kerr provide 100% of the forecast error without violating the guide curve (black), suggesting 
that even if prices for flex reserves properly reflect opportunity cost, multi-use hydroelectric dams may 
not be the lowest-cost option to provide wind integration services. Willingness to provide flex reserves is 
highest during off-peak hours in the spring of 2007 but drop substantially during these same months when 
transitioning to a sustained drought in 2008. Spring is an interesting indicator of environmentally-related 
policy constrains since the spawning season falls during these months, indicating that enhancing river 
conditions supports releases for flex reserves outside peak hours and severe drought conditions. (Contact 
lead author for further price sensitivity analysis and description of data.)  13 
 
 
Figure 2. Displays the capacity allocation for balancing an oversupply of wind power during hourly 
average monthly peak (left) and off-peak hours (right) from 2006 (top), 2007 (middle) and 2008 (bottom). 
All results are under the ecosystem services guide curve. We only show results up to a 50% price increase 14 
 
of the prevailing regulation prices within the market price cap. Darker regions indicate a higher 
allocation and white a lower allocation.   
3.2 Policy changes to promote the provision of flex reserves 
 
Water control plans used for storage and releases policies to meet multiple services play a pivotal 
role at Kerr Dam. We find that the ecosystem services guide curve cannot accommodate the timing and 
amount of the total wind power forecast errors at any realistic price; Kerr would have to exceed the guide 
curve and violate the energy declaration of allowable energy generation (Figure 3, for the case of the 
ecosystem services guide curve; results for the BAU guide curve are available upon request). While a 
system operator would hopefully have a portfolio of potential suppliers in a market for flex reserves, it is 
useful as a bounding analysis to consider how the guide curve for Kerr dam would have to change in 
order for Kerr to provide 100% of the total wind forecast error. We define a violation as the circumstance 
where the combined daily magnitude of oversupply and undersupply events exceeds the daily energy 
declaration; the magnitude of the violation is defined as the difference between the daily energy 
declaration and the combined daily magnitude of oversupply and undersupply events. Violations become 
more frequent and larger in magnitude from 2006 to 2008, but are generally lower in 2007. With a larger 
water supply in 2006, spot market sales dominate the Kerr’s capacity allocation decision (see Figures 1 
and 2) and supplying substantial shares of flex reserves would require significant changes to the 
ecosystem services guide curve. Smaller, less frequent violations occur in 2007, where we see again 
during the spring months (days 90-120) multi-purpose dam policies more easily accommodate flex 
reserves. Shrinking water supplies due to drought cause the largest violations; the policy conflicts arising 
from the provision of flex reserves (in terms of magnitude and timing of releases) are most evident here. 
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Figure 3. The panels feature the days where the total daily capacity requested to balance 100% of the 
forecast error exceeds the daily energy declaration (MWh) for the ecosystem services guide curve.  
Figure 4 provides a daily illustration of the violations to the ecosystem services guide curve that 
occur as we vary the amount of flex reserve capacity offered by Kerr Dam, assuming that flex reserve 
prices are similar to historical regulation prices in PJM (results for the BAU guide curve available upon 
request). In the figure, darker shading denotes larger violations of the daily energy declaration. Figure 4 
shows most clearly how trade-offs exist between balancing larger undersupply and oversupply events and 
minimizing violations to the guide curve. Spring and early summer days exhibit the least conflict with the 
ecosystem services guide curve, suggesting that drought-prone regions may be able to balance ecosystem 
services and wind flex reserves under slightly dry conditions. Extreme dry conditions in 2008 impose 
more constraints on operations not embodied in the guide curve; the policy conflicts appear to worsen 
during the transition from spring to summer.  16 
 
 
Figure 4. This figure shows the timing and amount the ecosystem services guide curve is exceeded by the 
total daily capacity required to balance the wind forecast error from 10% up to 100%. Black signifies a 
large quantity exceeding the guide curve, as seen in the early summer of 2008, with minimal violations to 
the guide curve in white, such as the winter months in 2006 and 2007.   
 
We performed some additional analysis calculating the opportunity cost, energy and volumetric 
flow adjustments arising from providing increasing percentages of the wind forecast error during wet to 
dry years 2006-2008 under ecosystem services guide curve. The results of this analysis are shown in 
Figure 5 (contact lead author for BAU guide curve results). The total wind forecast error, as defined in the 17 
 
figure, combines under and oversupply periods. Similar to Figures 3 and 4, we compare the daily energy 
declaration to the amount of flex reserve required during each day, based on our historical wind forecast 
error data.  If the requested flex reserves is larger than the energy declaration, we calculate adjustments to 
the guide curve necessary for Kerr to feasibly provide various proportions of the total requested flex 
reserves capacity (hence the use of percentage units in Figure 5).  
Opportunity cost indicates the foregone flex reserves revenue to Kerr due to release limitations 
set by the ecosystem services guide curve (panel a in Figure 5). Wetter water conditions show a small 
inter-annual opportunity cost increase from $8,646/MWh when providing 10 percent of requested flex 
reserves to $159,506/MWh when providing 100 percent of requested flex reserves (panel b). In 2008, the 
opportunity costs when providing 10 percent of requested flex reserves increases from $28,983 per year to 
$303,428 per year when providing 100 percent of requested flex reserves. To avoid incurring opportunity 
costs for balancing 100 percent of the flex reserves in 2008, Kerr would need to relax the ecosystem 
services guide curve by roughly double based on its 2006 annual energy adjustments of 5,337 MWh to 
11,451 MWh.  Kerr would also need to exceed the ecosystem services guide curve by a total of 
187,665,631 cubic feet per second (cfs) (panel c). Under current water management policies, this is an 
infeasible amount. From January to June 2008, BAU guide curve annual releases at Kerr reached 
20,926,348 cfs (796.80% smaller), and ecosystem services guide curve annual releases only reached 
60,680 cfs (30.91×10
4 percent smaller). Historical revenue Dominion earned from selling solely 
hydroelectricity in the PJM scheduled market in 2008 totaled $1.44 x 10
7
. Opportunity costs ($303,428) 
under the ecosystem services guide curve represent only 2.11% of the historical revenue, which would 
likely deter power utilities like Dominion from forgoing revenue in the scheduled energy market for a 
market with low earning potential. Even with price increases, though we showed Dominion is highly 
insensitive to extreme price increases, the complex and lengthy legal process necessary to alter a guide 
curve would impede a policy reform for a flex reserve market. A flex reserve market may provide some 
revenue for Kerr, but would require guide curve adjustments that are infeasible given current operating 18 
 
policies.  
 
 
Figure 5. Results here show the (a) opportunity, (b) energy adjustments, (c) and volumetric release 
changes to smooth increments of the total wind forecast error from 2006 through 2008 under ecosystem 
services. Panel (a) describes the annual opportunity cost or foregone revenue from selling flex reserve 
energy based on regulation market prices. Panel (b) describes the quantity of the energy adjustments 
needed annually to balance increasing percentages of the forecast error (MWh). Panel (c) describes the 
additional volumetric flow releases needed to provide the varying percentages of the wind forecast error 
annually. 
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4 Policy suggestions and conclusion 
 
  Large-scale wind integration requires supplemental energy reserves; the combination of ramping and 
storage characteristics, combined with low marginal operating cost, make many hydroelectric dams 
appealing candidates to provide these reserves.  We find, however, that the magnitude and timing of fill-
in power needed to balance the error in the wind power forecast stresses already constrained multi-use 
reservoirs. Our analysis focuses on the Kerr Dam in the Roanoke River Basin, a region with highly 
variable hydrological conditions and increased electricity and water demands. Our conclusions differ 
from those of NREL (2012) by suggesting that fundamental water management policy changes for 
reservoir releases, in addition to pricing reform in ancillary services markets  will be necessary to 
successfully integrate wind and hydroelectric power (see also (16)). Current regulation prices appear to 
provide little incentive for Kerr to accommodate a large amount of the wind power supply forecast errors 
(see Figures 2-5). Even if prices are increased substantially, the greater challenge of managing conflicts 
between energy and water management policies for multi-use dams will not be resolved.  
  The combination of severe drought conditions and strict water management policies based on the 
BAU and ecosystem services guide curves highly constrain Kerr’s ability to provide substantial amounts 
of capacity to correct for the wind forecast error in a market we call flex reserves (see Figure 5). 
Adjustments to either guide curve will likely need cooperative policy making to reach a compromise 
policy solution that benefits the multiple constituents involved with Kerr Dam. Results from this study 
provide the best case scenario for similar multi-purpose dams balancing distinct water and energy policy 
goals while operating within federal laws that control a reservoir’s operations and services. We suggest 
that the energy sector should consider the future uncertainty of surface water supplies because it will 
likely impact the long-term ability for hydropower to provide both base load and supplement energy (such 
as flex reserves). It is likely that historic water management policies will need to revise individual 20 
 
reservoirs policies in order to use hydropower to compensate for the variability of wind generation across 
the electrical grid. We urge for cooperative policy-making that include both energy and water 
management practices to better integrate large amounts of wind capacity with potential hydrological 
uncertainty and rising demands for electricity and water. 
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